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 Introduction 
 The quotation in the title of this chapter is from a comment endorsing the 
Panorama 1453 Museum, made upon its opening in 2009 by Özleyis Topbaş, 
wife of the then-mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş. 1 Until recently, the comment 
was used to market the museum on its website, alongside others by prominent 
members or supporters of the conservative-Islamist administration of the  Adalet 
 ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, henceforth JDP). The JDP 
has focused significant effort on fostering public memory of the capture of the 
Byzantine city of Constantinople on 29 May 1453. Festivities, re-enactments, 
public imagery, and the spectacular Panorama 1453 Museum tell a glorious 
story of the Ottoman victory and the magnanimous treatment of the defeated 
Byzantines. In these narratives, public audiences are invited to identify with the 
Ottomans, and to celebrate a ‘Turkish’ claim to presence reliant on the  Hadith 
in which the conquest is prophesied. Meanwhile, references to the Ottoman 
past in JDP discourse are frequent. 
 One aim of this chapter is to foreground the interplay of official heritage and 
political discourse. Here I will argue that in the populist rhetoric and cultural 
interventions of the JDP the historic, expansionist encroachment on others is 
glorified, and Islam is placed at the heart of the story of Turkish identity and 
homeland, contrary to the secular, Westernized identity of the early Republic. 
A second aim of this chapter is to analyze the responses to this governmental 
and authorized heritage by visitors whom I surveyed though short interviews. 
Here, the politics and affects of people’s encounters with the Conquest in the 
museum need to be related, on the one hand, to the emotional appeals of the 
JDP’s nostalgic populism – which concerns the need to recover a glorious past 
that has been stolen by political foes – and, on the other, to visitors’ resent-
ment towards those very foes: the disempowered secular elites. These, rather 
than the Byzantines, are the real enemy for the museum’s audiences. Finally, 
this chapter explores the social and political role of the museum in provid-
ing a space for the expression of animosity. This consolidates social division 
and polarization in the interests of the status quo, while also representing the 
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overlaps between political, emotional, and memory cultures and communities. 
In exploring this, I seek to work in alignment with recent thinking in heritage 
studies that develops understandings of the interrelations between historical 
memory culture, politics, and emotion, as exemplified by Laurajane Smith and 
Gary Campbell: 
 If we accept that heritage is political, that it is a political resource used in 
conflicts over the understanding of the past and its relevance for the pres-
ent, then understanding how the interplay of emotions, imagination and 
the process of remembering and commemoration are informed by people’s 
culturally and socially diverse affective responses must become a growing 
area of focus for the field. 
 ( 2015 : 18) 
 In this chapter it is Ottoman heritage that is the ‘political resource’ described 
above. This is because it offers a compendium of values that can be mined by 
party-political actors to present ideals of national identity and citizenship. At 
the same time, my research found that such official attempts to ‘bring back’ 
the Ottoman past as national history – foregrounding 1453 and not 1923 (the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic) – was a potent means of tapping into 
conservative-Islamist audiences’ sense of long suffering and suppression under 
the stridently secularist regimes prior to JDP ascendancy. This means that 
remembering the Conquest is bound up with a sense of loss, anger, and antag-
onistic reference to one’s enemies at home, alongside a sense that it is finally 
possible to return to a true identity after decades of injustice. 
 In the 1994 local elections, an Islamist party – the Welfare Party ( Refah Partisi ) – 
won a decisive victory and conservative-Islamist mayors were installed in many 
municipalities, including Istanbul; then, in the 1995 general elections, the party 
won the majority of the vote. With the rise of the Welfare Party, the promi-
nence of Islam in the public domain increased ( Göle, 1997 ;  Navaro-Yashin, 
2002 ) and Ottoman history became yet more visible ( White, 2014 : 8–9). 
 The change also occurred in celebration and commemorations of national 
historical moments. The key events identified by Ottoman historiography were 
not celebrated during the early Republican era ( Çınar, 2001 : 365). Rather, 
during that time new national days were ‘invented’ in the sense articulated 
by  Hobsbawm and Ranger ([1983]1992 ) to commemorate Atatürk and the 
reforms of the early Republic. These include 29 October (the foundation of 
Turkey in 1923), 23 April (the First Assembly was established in Ankara in 
1922; Atatürk devoted this date to children), and 19 May (the date that Atatürk 
started the War of Liberation). Alongside this is a prominent visual culture 
relating to Atatürk – who, we should recall, died in 1938 – including literally 
thousands of photographic and sculptural images of him in public space, not 
to mention the proliferation of his image in people’s houses, or his signature, 
replicated in bumper stickers and tattoos. 
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 Nevertheless, in recent years the JDP has moved away from big public cel-
ebrations associated with the Republic, to focus instead on Islamic and Otto-
man ones. Instead of the celebration of the foundation of the Turkish Republic 
in 1923, historical events like the Conquest of Constantinople in 1453 have 
become more central in the public and official sphere, through celebrations 
and festivities ( Çınar, 2001 ). The Conquest was not absent from state histo-
riography or public commemoration before the changes described above (it 
was celebrated in 1953, for example), but was of second-order significance 
compared to the public memory culture relating to Atatürk. In 1994 Erdoğan 
became mayor of Istanbul, and since then celebrations of the Ottoman past 
have taken place and gained more stridently Islamist character ( Zurcher, 2016 ). 
This has involved what I have elsewhere called ‘memory wars’ ( Bozoğlu, 2020 ), 
in which memory actors, who are also political actors, more or less associated 
with party positions, have sought to destabilize or erase memory cultures that 
they see as inimical to their own. The memory cultures of Atatürk exist today 
in a tense interrelationship with those of Neo-Ottomanism. But in many ways 
they also influence and depend on one another, for the stories of heroism 
and victory are comparable and each relies on its righteous and intransigent 
opposition to the other. This makes it particularly important for the current 
administration to invest in the grandeur of 1453. In the anniversary celebra-
tions, re-enactments of the battle symbolically ‘perform the conquest again’ 
( Çınar, 2001 ; Büyüksaraç, 2004;  Hürriyet Daily News, 2016 ). There is also 
often a re-enactor who plays the role of Sultan Mehmet on his white horse, 
‘re-entering’ the city. The meanings of these re-enactment practices can be 
seen to connect to official practice in museums, and also to political discourse, 
media representations, and global power plays: as part of the 2017 celebra-
tions, 1,453 lorries were assembled as a world record attempt in a vehicular 
parade to mark construction of the new Istanbul airport – a past-present relay 
between the might and achievement of the Ottomans and contemporary Tur-
key as global powerhouse. 
 One of the dimensions of so-called neo-Ottomanism is the use of a selective 
account of the Ottoman past to power identity constructions among the citi-
zenry in the present ( Girard, 2015 : 3). The JDP’s project to rewrite national 
history with an emphasis on the Ottoman past has been subject to significant 
and extensive attention and critique. 2 In one authorized heritage discourse 
( Smith, 2006 ), the Ottoman past is presented as a source of pride, and a com-
pendium of virtues and values for people to emulate: indomitable strength, 
valour, self-sacrifice, and piety. As part of a public discourse of ancestry and 
descendence, promoted by JDP actors, some people make elective, highly 
emotional connections between themselves and ‘the Ottomans’, construct-
ing historical continuities that position them as the inheritors of a legacy of 
greatness that should be preserved and restored. This discourse, together with 
immersive spectacles in which people can imagine themselves  as Ottomans 
within the historic scene of the Conquest, are what Geoffrey  Cubitt (2007 ) 
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terms ‘cultural devices’. These enable people to incorporate a remote past 
into autobiographical memory, and to bridge the dissonance between past 
and present: as Topbaş says, to ‘keep the sensation of the Conquest alive’. This 
also occurs in forms of temporal bridging across public and private space: it 
is possible to buy neo-Ottoman houses; Ottoman clothes are fashionable for 
events such as circumcision celebrations; JDP politicians break ground for new 
grand projects on 29 May (the day of the Conquest); Ottoman military music 
is played in public spaces during Ramadan; and Erdoğan often surrounds him-
self with men dressed up as Janissary Guards during official appearances. All 
of these, and many other examples that there is no space to cite, normalize 
a practice of shuttling between past and present that forecloses any sense of 
cultural difference between the two. 
 The discourse of Ottoman revival is articulated across an array of forms of 
representation, not all of which are in the idiom of ‘heritage’ in the sense of 
designated sites, museums, protected traditions, and so on. Indeed, for the 
Ottoman past to seem really present, it is important that it is not restricted to 
containers of the past such as museums, but rather spills out into everyday prac-
tices and cultural forms. Some of this overspill is manifest in banal discursive 
connections made in political speeches, or the official naming of new features 
of the urban landscape. Then, as with the comment from Topbaş and the other 
dignitaries who endorsed the Panorama 1453 Museum, there are instances 
in which the apparent divide between heritage politics and party politics is 
bridged: when politicians open museums, or use spectacular, state-funded his-
torical re-enactments as opportunities for giving speeches. Before discussing 
these relations, I will introduce the museum and its visitors, setting them into 
the broader context of neo-Ottoman memory culture. 
 Panorama 1453 Museum 
 The Panorama 1453 Museum (P1453) is sited in the Topkapı area of Istan-
bul, adjacent to the Land Walls of Istanbul. It was opened in 2006 by (then) 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. By some (but not all) reports, it was 
Erdoğan himself who introduced the idea of a panorama after having visited 
panoramic museums in Europe during his tenure as mayor of Istanbul (1994–
1998) ( Bozoğlu 2020 ). One of Erdoğan’s successors as mayor of Istanbul, Kadir 
Topbaş (in office 2004–2017), was another key figure in the museum’s develop-
ment, intervening directly in structuring the museum and subsequently using 
it as a showcase to impress dignitaries and sympathetic journalists ( Bozoğlu 
2020 ). While it is clearly not unusual for museums to be opened and used by 
politicians, in the case of P1453 there was and is an explicit link between the 
museum and the JDP, and an open correspondence between the party-political 
uses of the Ottoman past and the stated aims of the museum. In the last lines of 
the web material, the cultural wing of the Metropolitan Municipality states that 
it is ‘freezing this historical moment and giving it as a gift to the future from 
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the 1453 Panorama Museum, which is in a place whose soul enlightens our 
present as well as our future’. It continues, ‘We hope that you will always keep 
enthusiasm for the conquest alive and that it will inspire future conquerors’. 
 In governmental terms then, the museum’s project of influencing (or indeed 
‘inspiring’) its visitors is not banal, subtle, or subtextual: as we have seen, the 
political link with the JDP is celebrated. Although expressly partisan, the very 
use of the museum form – although P1453 has no collection in the conven-
tional museal sense – constitutes an appeal to accuracy and truth-telling about 
the Conquest. Verbal interpretation makes frequent reference to academic his-
torians consulted during the museum’s development, and to the producers’ 
rigorous use of source materials. If this co-presence of an accuracy claim  and 
proudly partisan politics seems paradoxical, it need not be, so long as one 
accepts that the JDP itself ‘speaks truth’. In this sense the party avails itself of 
the museum as a technology of authority, appropriating its associations as the 
archetypal institution of objectivity and rigour. 
 A brief account of the museum’s development and its mission and orienta-
tion was, until recently, given on the website. 3 It starts with the description of 
 Topkapı Cultural Park, where the museum is situated: 
 Topkapı Cultural Park, a place where an era was closed and a new era was 
opened, where the epic of the Conquest was written, where Mehmed 
the second was named as ‘Conqueror’, a place where Byzantium, Istanbul 
and hearts were conquered. The Culture Park is the place [ adres ] of the 
Ottoman family who flourished in the shadow of the mountains covering 
the horizon in Söğüt, who opened the breach in the walls of the City and 
turned into a mighty oak which sprouted many branches. 
 The oak tree relates to the Dream of Osman I, recounted in the thirteenth-
century Turkish-Anatolian epic poem of the same name, in which Osman’s 
vision of a tree prefigures the Ottomans, as a metaphor of the future growth 
and spread of Islam. The park itself is home to a number of pavilions, each of 
which showcases the traditional ‘Culture of the Turkic World Neigbourhood’ 
( Türk Dünyası Kültür Mahallesi ). This Pan-Turkism goes beyond the Ottoman 
Empire, for it includes states that were not under Ottoman control. Although 
it cannot strictly be called a neo-Ottomanist gesture, there are important points 
of contact, for they both involve reference to Turkey’s historic influence in the 
wider world. In this way the park frames the museum, bringing together differ-
ent dimensions of neo-Ottomanism as a recovery both of local cultural identity 
and of global power. This was made yet more explicit in Erdoğan’s speech at 
the museum’s opening ceremony: 
 Istanbul is the heritage of the great world empire; as much as it represents 
Bursa, Van, Diyarbakır, Trabzon, Sivas, Konya, Edirne and Sakarya, it also 
represents Sarajevo, Kmotini, Skopje and Pristina. Our children [ yavru ] 
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who will visit the museum will say, ‘wow, who was I [how glorious I once 
was]!’ We do not want our youth to be raised with an inferiority complex. 
 (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Website, 2009) 4 
 P1453 is phenomenally popular and receives, according to official records, a 
high volume of visitors for its small physical size: up to 6,900 a day some-
times, and over half a million per year. During my own numerous visits, the 
museum was frequently packed, with large crowds often predominantly popu-
lated by conservative Muslim visitors (conspicuous because of Islamic dress) 
who engage closely, not just by reading and looking but also through other 
behaviours. These include bodily gestures, exclamations, expressions of emo-
tion and being moved, including crying, and taking selfies against the backdrop 
of the panorama. 
 The museum is not spectacular from outside: it is a small, domed building 
with reproductions of nineteenth-century, Western orientalist engravings on its 
exterior walls, such as those common in magazines like the  Illustrated London 
News . As we move into the museum, we are greeted by a mannequin of Sultan 
Mehmet II, often called ‘Fatih’, or ‘the Conquerer’, 5 and we then negotiate a 
complicated route through a number of corridors. On the walls of these are 
reproductions of images of Constantinople and of Sultan Mehmet II, accom-
panied by text panels containing around 15,000 words of historical narrative of 
and explanation for the Conquest, and characterizations of Sultan Mehmet II. As 
an example, one of the English-language summaries of the Turkish texts gives 
an account of the predestination of the Conquest: 
 This painting [actually an enlargement of a passage of calligraphic Islamic 
script] illustrates the Conquest Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
most well-known evangel regarding the Conquest of the city is the ‘Con-
quest Event’. ‘The city of Konstantinniye is destined to be conquered. 
The Commander that will conquer that city is a good one. And the army 
that will conquest [ sic ] the city is a good one.’ This Hadith encourages the 
conqueror and his army even more, thus his army conquered the city with 
a great will and determinism [ sic ]. 
 This is one of several references to the importance of the  hadith and to Islam, 
framing other texts about the necessity for conquest, since Constantinople was 
in decline and ‘waiting’ for a new era, the technological ingenuity of the Otto-
man forces, the innovative use of artillery cannon, and Sultan Mehmet II’s 
character: Mehmet II was ‘clever, stubborn, sharp, active and liked physical 
sports’, understood literature and science, and ‘grew up dreaming of the Con-
quest’. One text states that his ‘sword was never sheathed; his boots never left 
his feet’. Another key theme is the ‘tolerance’ and the ‘justice’ of the Ottomans 
towards the defeated Byzantines: 
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 By way of their  gaza politics [a name given to a holy war waged in order 
to protect or spread Islam], justice, tolerance and social, cultural and reli-
gious practices, the Ottomans firstly conquered people’s hearts and then 
their castles. 
 The interpretive framing of the Conquest presents it explicitly as divinely 
ordained, rightful, and progressive. Nevertheless, the texts show an obvious 
political inflection in which a singular view of the Conquest emerges. As might 
be imagined, there are competing stories of the Conquest, including many 
from primary sources ( Mansel, 1995 : 1;  Feldman, 2008 ), and these are much 
less glorious in nature. Some recount, for example, gratuitous slaughter after 
the fall of the city, and the pressing into sexual slavery of the city’s youths. No 
space is accorded to contradictory narratives such as these. The idea of ‘con-
quest’ is unambiguously positive where in other settings it might be a term that 
bespeaks violent invasion and appropriation, thus providing material to build a 
‘politics of regret’ into Turkish national identity frameworks. Any such qualms 
are dispelled because of the idea of predestination, the selective remembering 
of events, righteousness, and the focus on the victorious Sultan Mehmet II’s 
magnanimity and fairness, when he issued a firman allowing for the continued 
practice of diverse religions among his new subjects. Indeed, in the museum 
there is a film of the firman being read in public, to the joyful and relieved 
responses of the assembled citizens. 
 After this textual set-up, we proceed to the panorama room itself. The pan-
orama shows the battle in progress. We emerge from a staircase as if into the past, 
finding ourselves in a domed room, with a monumental 360-degree painting 
of the battle, 3D replica weapons strewn around, and an audiotrack of battle 
sounds and traditional  mehter military music. There are reputedly over 10,000 
figures in the painting, and all of them men at war, characterizing the masculin-
ized nature of the national story on display. On occasion, the warding personnel 
wear Ottoman costume. When we look at the scenes in the painting, we first 
face an image of a tree, a further reference to Osman’s vision. To the right is 
Sultan Mehmet II on horseback, directing the battle ( Image 4.1 ). In the sky 
projectiles fly overhead, and the sun breaks cloud cover – perhaps a play on the 
long-standing Western pictorial tradition of signalling victory and a new, bet-
ter era through depicting meteorological changes. There is some magic here 
too: an image of Sultan Mehmet’s face is discernible in the cloud formations. 
Elsewhere we see corps of soldiers rushing into battle; ‘sappers’ digging tunnels 
under the walls of Constantinople for explosives; defensive ‘Greek fire’ (large 
ceramic pots of flaming oil and rags) falling down from above as if on the visitors 
themselves ( Image 4.2 ); and the walls being breached in various places. In one 
of these scenes, the soldier Ulubatlı Hasan (Hasan of Ulubat) hoists the Otto-
man flag on the walls ( Image 4.3 ). There is a well-known story that he defended 
the flag heroically, inspiring the Ottomans and disheartening the defenders 
 Image 4.2  A group of visitors look at the Greek fire flying towards the Ottoman soldiers. 
 Source: Photo by Gönül Bozog˘ lu. Art Director of the Museum is Has¸im Vatandas¸. Artists are Has¸im 
Vatandas¸, Ramazan Erkut, Yas¸ar Zeynalov, Oksana Legka, Ahmet Kaya (storyboard), Hasan H. Dinçer, 
Atilla Tunca, and Murat Efe. 
 Image 4.1  Sultan Mehmet II on his white horse in the middle of his retinue. Panorama 
1453 Museum. 
 Source: Photo by Gönül Bozog˘ lu. Art Director of the Museum is Has¸im Vatandas¸. Artists are Has¸im 
Vatandas¸, Ramazan Erkut, Yas¸ar Zeynalov, Oksana Legka, Ahmet Kaya (storyboard), Hasan H. Dinçer, 
Atilla Tunca, and Murat Efe. 
Emotional politics of the Panorama 1453 Museum 99
notwithstanding the multiple arrow injuries from which he subsequently died. 
Hasan is widely celebrated in ubiquitous imagery and public statuary in Turkey – 
an Istanbul metro station is named after him near the site of his supposed feat of 
heroism – but his real existence has been doubted ( Hür, 2014 ). He is neverthe-
less an influential symbol of Ottoman valour and self-sacrifice. 
 Indeed, the different scenes in the panorama are far from obscure in their 
references: they were noticed by various respondents during my visitor studies, 
and this is unsurprising given their prominence in popular culture, for example 
in the 2012 film  Fetih 1453 about the Conquest, in which characters such 
as Hasan of Ulubat appear. In 2015 I conducted 103 ten- to thirty-minute 
interviews with visitors to understand the importance for them of the museum 
visit. 6 There is no space here for a full account of the responses (see  Bozoğlu 
2020 for this); instead, I concentrate on exemplary themes and statements from 
visitors. These included some of the tropes discussed above, as, for example, 
 Image 4.3  The breaching of one of the bastions: Ulubatlı Hasan (Hasan of Ulubat) is first 
to hoist the Ottoman flag on the wall. 
 Source: Photo by Gönül Bozog˘ lu. Art Director of the Museum is Has¸im Vatandas¸. Artists are Has¸im 
Vatandas¸, Ramazan Erkut, Yas¸ar Zeynalov, Oksana Legka, Ahmet Kaya (storyboard), Hasan H. Dinçer, 
Atilla Tunca, and Murat Efe. 
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when visitors frequently referred to the Ottomans as their ancestors ( ecdat ), 
often expressing shame that they could not live up to their memory: 
 We were curious about what the Ottomans did for us. Although this is my 
fifth visit, I am still astounded by what they did. We do not even pray for 
them! Not in a mosque or in everyday life! I will continue to come back 
here again and again. 
 (Female, 28, housewife) 
 Some expressed a desire to return to or reprise an Ottoman existence. For 
example, visitors promised themselves to cultivate more ‘Ottoman’ behaviour 
in future (in one case, a ‘more Ottoman soul’). Some used the panorama to 
imagine themselves into the battle, feeding into desires to revert to old ways of 
life that were also expressions of loss of identity and refusal of modernity: 
 Experiencing that moment [the Conquest] is so different. I wish I was on 
one of those horses. Why did that not happen? I really want that, I mean 
it: to be one of those who were holding a shield. At least to teach swords 
and shields to people is our duty. 
 (Male, 29, butcher) 
 Alongside pride and admiration of the Ottoman achievement (e.g. ‘We have 
intimidated the world!’), another conspicuous theme was the importance of 
regaining memory that had been forgotten or, more often, ‘taken away’ by oth-
ers. In some statements, these ‘others’ were not explicitly named (‘They took 
our ancestors away from us’), but could clearly be identified with the secular, 
Kemalist elite, as was made explicit by others: 
 The Republican period erased our society’s memory. Where is  my [ruler]? 
They sent him into exile! 
 (Male, 60, retired civil servant) 
 And one twenty-one-year-old male commented: 
 In fact, the new generation and we included have been forced to focus on 
the Republic’s [history and ideology] and they have been trying to make us 
forget about our origin and  real past. This museum was established to stop 
this. In a similar way, making films and TV serials has the same reason: to 
prevent us from forgetting our self [‘ öz ’]. 
 (Male, 21, student) 
 Turkish National TV channels show serials about the Ottomans such as  Diriliş 
( Resurrection ). There are also film productions such as  Fetih 1453 ( Conquest 
1453 ), and at the time of writing more such shows are being produced, 
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notably  Payitaht: Abdülhamid . Many respondents mentioned these. This cross-
referencing between televisual and museal representations of the Ottomans is 
indicative of the intertextuality of different representations and their integrated 
meaning for people for whom the Ottomans have become salient for identity. 
This intertextuality is actively supported by the JDP: alongside endorsements 
of P1453, Erdoğan has also encouraged people to watch historical dramas about 
the Ottomans, such as  Diriliş and, subsequent to my data collection,  Payitaht: 
Abdülhamid , so that ‘[we may] understand our history’ and ‘know what we 
once were’ ( Armstrong 2018 ). 
 The project of regaining a past, and an identity connected to it, also car-
ried through into a number of statements directly or indirectly connecting the 
Ottomans to Erdoğan or suggesting that it was the JDP who were responsible 
for bringing back the ‘forgotten’ and ‘real’ past: 
 I have come to see what the Ottomans did for us. The people [i.e. politi-
cians] who are fighting for a seat should come and see this place. Also, the 
ones who begrudge Erdoğan his position should come and see this. I feel 
very emotional. This is my first visit but I will come back here. You see 
how Turkey was rescued with such difficulty, how we have come to this 
situation with such difficulty. With such difficulty, our integrity [‘ namus ’] 
and honour were rescued and now we are here. People should pray and 
give thanks. Like the Ottomans, our dear president [Erdoğan] is also fight-
ing for these values. People should know the value of our president. 
 (Female, 65, housewife) 
 Responses of this kind, and those that involve implicit or explicit expressions of 
grievance towards secular Republicans, support the argument that the appeal of 
the JDP’s neo-Ottomanist nostalgia is to ‘mend’ people’s relationship with the 
past, and to reinstate what Atatürk disestablished in 1923 (Temelkuran, 2015: 
11). What should be evident from this is that responses of this kind were about 
something that was not evidently present in the museum: there was no explicit 
mention in displays of Atatürk or of the early Republic, and yet this was a key 
reference point and object of resentment for many of my respondents. ‘Resent-
ment’ (and ‘ ressentiment ’) has nuanced and varied definitions across literatures 
( Demertzis, 2006 ), but in the setting of P1453 I mean, with  resentment , the 
sense that emerged from respondents of having been unjustly deprived – by a 
dominant political elite with unshared values – of one’s historical memory and 
identity. What was ‘taken’ from visitors by this enemy group, in other words, 
was that faculty to identify oneself in history as Ottoman. This faculty per-
tains to complex contemporary political and social contests, including a clash 
between secularism and state-sponsored Sunni Islam. 
 This begs the questions: To whom did the panorama’s producers think the 
museum would appeal and why? What effect did its producers hope for in those 
audiences? There is insufficient space here to discuss the interviews I undertook 
102 Gönül Bozog˘lu
with its producers (for more discussion, see  Bozoğlu, 2020 ), but three main 
themes emerged from this. Firstly, the producers insisted on their historical neu-
trality and objectivity, in what was both a disciplinary ideal of achieving accu-
racy and a means of warding off the accusations of partisanship and selective 
remembering that had appeared in unsympathetic news media outlets ( Aytalar 
and Oktay, 2009 ). Secondly, the producers were content to see the emotional 
and indeed the religious response that the museum provoked in its visitors: 
 Well, people get very emotional and say they have goose bumps, because 
there are a lot of reasons, and we worked hard on it, and there are so many 
details, and that gets an appreciative response. We were neutral here and 
we just showed how Istanbul was conquered.  .  . . There are queues on 
the weekend, and we hear people cry, and we hear people pray, so we are 
happy with what we achieved. 
 (Interview with a producer, 2015) 
 Thirdly, the insistence on historical ‘truth’ meant that the producers disavowed 
any attempt to target specific visitors, even if in fact the audience profile is 
limited. For them, the panorama was not a matter of tailoring the past to suit 
a particular group; it was simply truth-telling. Of course, neutrality in curator-
ship is a long-standing fallacy in museology, and the denial of governmental-
ity it involves may be a question of institutional face and/or naturalization 
processes at work. Actors of governmentality do not all covertly subscribe to 
a surreptitious project of forging citizenship that they hide from audiences 
and interviewers. In her work on Northern Cyprus as a ‘make-believe’ state, 
Yael  Navaro-Yashin (2012 ) discusses banal, pervasive, and coincidental affects 
of administrations and modes of governance that are generative. They can 
‘produce’ a state, but potentially also its history. In a governmental view, such 
affects may frame the ‘objective’ worldviews and desires of producers as self-
regulating subjects themselves, contributing to the slow repetition of stories 
and expert claims made in public memory culture and authorized heritage 
discourse ( Smith, 2006 ). If it seems easy to debunk the apolitical neutrality 
of the curatorial position described in the quotation, it certainly seems not to 
match the political and antagonistic content of the visitor comments, the pride 
taken by producers in visitors’ heightened emotional and religious responses, or 
the complex political history of the museum and its overt party links. To read 
against the grain of the quotation, which I have taken care to say does need not 
be considered disingenuous, a more nuanced understanding of the museum’s 
situated meaning for politics and society is needed. I turn to this now. 
 Discussion: emotional politics of the past 
 To understand why visitors expressed resentment against an absent enemy, we 
must consider the museum in its time. It opened in 2009, although it had been 
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in germination and development for some years previously. By the time of the 
opening, the JDP had been in power for nearly seven years, and the museum 
can be seen as part of a general project of instituting a neo-Ottoman memory 
culture to accompany, or in another view to supplant, the memory cultures of 
Atatürk and the early Republic that have such pronounced public visibility in 
Turkey ( Navaro-Yashin, 2013 ;  Tharoor, 2017 ). These can be and have been 
seen as antagonistic memory cultures with separate heroes, symbols, narratives, 
and meanings that crystallize in different political and civil ideals of the nation: 
as secular, modernist, and Westernized; or as (Sunni) Islamic, fundamentally 
non- or anti-Western and atavistic ( Zencirci, 2014 : 3). These antagonistic ide-
als attach to antagonistic groups, each of which celebrates one past but not the 
other, avails itself of an associated, specific repertoire of emotional practice, and 
takes a specific political side. It is in the interplays between historical memory, 
emotion, and political standpoint, among other dimensions, that group identi-
ties are made and maintained. The JDP and its supporters were, upon the open-
ing of the museum, in a position of consolidated strength. Indeed, the JDP was 
later to increase its percentage of the vote in the 2011 general elections, mark-
ing its third victory at the ballot (of four, at the time of writing). The secular 
legacy of Atatürk and its supporters were beleaguered. 
 This brings up a question: Why, at a time when the JDP and its support-
ers enjoyed dominant status, was there a need for the museum? One possible 
answer is that in Turkey there is always a sense of the latent possibility of dra-
matic political change, for example through coup attempts or as threatened 
in cases of mass civil disorder such in the 2013 Gezi Protests ( Whitehead and 
Bozoğlu, 2016 ), that make any regime fragile, however dominant it may seem. 
Notwithstanding its typically large margin of support at the ballot box, the 
JDP needs to actively cultivate its supporters and provide identity resources 
for them. As a consequence, we may see P1453 as such a provision, offer-
ing objects of attachment (the Ottomans) and  implicit objects for resentment 
(secularists/Kemalists). Atatürk and his political followers are, in this sense, an 
 absent presence ( Law, 2002 ) at the museum: they are not there in the displays, 
images, and texts, but their absence is built into the historiographical structure 
of the representation; the museum has been, as it were, designed against their 
memory. Beyond the museum, Ottoman historical memory and identity is 
more generally discursively pitted against the JDP’s secularist enemies, as when 
Erdoğan, at a 2014 rally, exhorted his followers to give the Republican People’s 
Party ( Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ) an ‘Ottoman Slap’ at the ballot boxes ( Reuters 
and Haaretz, 2014 ). By authorizing the story of the Conquest and celebrat-
ing the Ottomans and through its intertextual arrangement in public discur-
sive space, the museum opened up an alternative nationalist historiography to 
contrast with the previously dominant Republican national story. At the same 
time, the glorification of Sultan Mehmet II can be seen as an attempt to sup-
plant Atatürk’s post-mortem cult of personality, as if to create a new national 
hero for attachment. In these senses it is unsurprising that visitors identified 
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modern secularists as their enemy, rather than the Byzantines. The Byzantines 
were definitely, definitively defeated; the secularists, only temporarily (the fra-
gility of the JDP ascendancy has indeed been verified at the time of writing, in 
the June 2019 municipal election won by Ekrem İmamoğlu, leading a coalition 
of the secularist Republican People’s Party and the Good Party ( İyi Parti ), both 
of which represent secularist and Kemalist interests). 
 So far, I have shown the close interrelation between historical memory poli-
tics and party politics in the governmental framing of the museum. P1453 pres-
ents an emotionalized, selective, and dramatic narrative of the past into which 
visitors have the opportunity to imagine themselves and thus to configure 
identities – for themselves and for their enemies. It could be argued that P1453 
shares many of the techniques of populist discourse: the great and special man 
(Sultan Mehmet II), magically predestined to greatness; the friend-and-foe 
dynamics ( Mudde, 2004 ;  Kaya, 2016 ); the heroic struggle and righteousness 
of the ordinary people, including emblematic heroes like Hasan who trigger 
learned emotional responses; and so on. To this we might add the popular 
appeal of the representational technology of the panorama, with its high drama 
and direct messages. It is not a long stretch to suggest that Mehmet II might 
function as a proxy figure for Erdoğan. As far back as his Istanbul mayoral 
campaign prior to election in 1994, he had played on the theme of the ‘second 
conquest’ of the city, which he promised to carry ‘from darkness to light’, ‘just 
as Sultan Mehmed of the Ottoman Empire had done when he had conquered 
the city in 1453’ (in Büyüksaraç, 2004). There is then a strategic interdepen-
dence of heritage discourse and party politics. 
 I have also presented a sample of visitor comments that represent those visi-
tors’ enthusiastic take-up of the opportunities presented by the museum. These 
are opportunities for visitors to relay imaginatively between past and present 
(once again, keeping the ‘bliss of the Conquest alive’). Smith and Campbell 
point out that people  desire to have emotional responses, and they seek them 
out and look to museums and heritage sites to mediate them; they become 
skilled at recognizing and ‘working with’ their emotions in such settings ( 2015 : 
445). Although it would be misleading to suggest that this is universally true 
of all museum visitors, at P1453 the obvious emotional behaviour of visitors 
chimes with Smith and Campbell’s view. The immersive, time-travel technol-
ogy of the panorama is important here. You need to be able to travel back 
in time to fully experience what you have lost, and therefore to be able to 
savour that loss. Consequently, the museum acts as a space in which to express 
emotional grievance against a social and political enemy group responsible for 
depriving visitors of their notional past and identity. In my sample, this enemy 
group represented a loose construct of repressive secularism against which 
respondents felt it was finally possible to rail, after decades of privation. 
 However, such emotional expressions did not involve an evident release, so 
much as a mixture of continued animosity and vigilance.  Rico et al. (2017 ) 
suggest that it is anger, and not fear, that is the defining emotion of populism, 
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which, as a ‘Manichean ideology that conceives politics as the antagonistic 
struggle between the benevolent people and the evil elite’ (drawing on  Mudde, 
2004 ), should be ‘more appealing to angry than to anxious citizens’, and more 
likely to mobilize subjects who, in a fearful state, would be passive. Certainly, 
my visitor studies showed expressions of anger. But I have tried to suggest that 
this is also a result of latent anxiety about political futures: that the foes who 
repressed people’s senses of their ‘history’ and identity may return to power. A 
way through this is to suggest that it is more helpful to see the emotions of fear 
and anger as consecutive rather than singular, and that, as Margaret Wetherell 
suggests, emotions may run in ‘affective-discursive loops’, triggering and flow-
ing into one another recursively (Wetherell, 2012). This also accounts for flows 
and relays between other emotions in P1453, including shame at not living up 
to the example of one’s notional ancestors. 
 What is needed, in cases like P1453, is a relational study of memory, poli-
tics, and emotion capable of capturing the meanings, uses, and salience of the 
past in the present in public institutions, space, and discourse and in people’s 
lives. The study of emotion in politics has a relatively developed tradition, 
especially relating to the surge of interest in populism (see  Clarke et al., 2006 ; 
 Wright-Neville and Smith, 2009 ;  Eklundh and Massey, 2013 ;  Kassab, 2016 ; 
 Rico et al., 2017 ). In this literature, broadly speaking, there have been moves 
to overcome rationalist models that see emotion as extraneous to or undesir-
able within politics, towards understandings of politics and emotion as always 
entangled ( Clarke et al., 2006 : 7–8). Meanwhile, in memory and heritage 
studies there is an ongoing turn to affect ( Smith, 2006 ;  Macdonald, 2013 ; 
 Smith and Campbell, 2015 ;  Witcomb, 2015 ,  2016 ; Tolia-Kelly et al., 2017). 
Here too, there has been a move away from reductively cognitive understand-
ings of people’s understandings of the past, towards more integrated models 
of meaning-making that include embodied, sensory, and affective dimensions. 
In this view, the past can be emotional matter, and we can ask socio-political 
questions about why this is, for whom, when, and where. 
 In both literatures, there is the possibility of focusing on the emotional work 
of the powerful actors – party politicians, or museums, for example – which 
may aim to elicit, prompt, and mobilize emotions among citizens. Otherwise, 
one can focus on the emotional responses of the citizens who are the targets 
of this work. A third way is to see this relationship dynamically. Certain emo-
tional memory cultures – such as those tied to the commemoration of specific 
events like the Conquest of Constantinople, or historical individuals like Sultan 
Mehmet II – have a pre-existence and salience among some social groups, and 
members of those groups go both to sites of ‘heritage’ and memory, be they 
museums or historical re-enactments in public space, and to the ballot box. 
In some cases, such memory cultures are, because of the familiarity of their 
narratives and emotional patternings, amenable to cultivation, exploitation, 
reworking, and investment that are simultaneously in the interests of power-
ful political actors, while also responding to the emotional needs of citizens 
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to conceptualize and position themselves in history and society. This is better 
seen as an interplay between top-down and from-below emotional memory 
practice – a tacit negotiation between the needs of political actors and those of 
citizens – rather than a unidirectional emotional manipulation of the masses by 
way of imposed historical memory. The museum is at once a strategic mobili-
zation of emotions and a site for the willing to practise emotion and to exercise 
a politico-historical identity based on animosity. 
 In the still-somewhat-separate literatures on affect and emotion generally, 
politics and emotion, and heritage and emotion, we find discrete conceptions 
of community.  Emotional communities share emotional repertoires (see  Weth-
erell, 2012 ).  Political communities share political beliefs, interests, and stand-
points ( Walzer, 1983 ). And  memory communities share attachment to given 
pasts ( Irwin-Zarecka, 2007 ). I suggest that these are not so much comparable 
as overlapping structures. So, for example, groups who share political beliefs 
often also share attachments to certain pasts, and emotional repertoires that 
make these politics and attachments meaningful and personal. Nor, obviously, 
are these dimensions of community the only ones that we can speak of – 
religiosity, for example, is another. The overlap between such dimensions of 
community may not always be total. It is unlikely that everyone for whom the 
Ottomans are important identity references will also be ardent JDP supporters. 
But my suggestion is that there are cases, such as the one represented by my 
P1453 study, where there is a high degree of consonance between the politi-
cal, emotional, and memory dimensions of community, or, to put it differently, 
where these dimensions interlock closely and tightly. 
 Final thoughts: historical memory and social division 
 The next steps for understanding the emotional politics of the past are to 
understand this multidimensional nature of community and, then, what this 
means for broader social relations  between communities who have to negotiate 
what Ash Amin calls the ‘politics of propinquity’ ( 2002 ), which ‘derives from 
the fact that groups marked, perceived and/or identifying as different from 
one another live in the same “places”’ ( Whitehead and Lanz, 2020 ). Different 
negotiations of propinquity can involve significant intergroup tension, as I saw 
in my research, which showed up again the well-remarked antagonism between 
conservative Sunni Muslim groups and secular Kemalists ( Zencirci, 2014 : 3). 
Such tension may be tantamount to social division and polarization. 
 In Ian Lustick’s classic definition, a deeply divided society is where ‘ascrip-
tive ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal 
identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period and a 
wide variety of issues’. This characterizes well the situation where family, social 
networks, and ways of life can lead to relatively static identities and attach-
ments both to political and memory cultures in Turkey. Lustick adds that, as a 
minimum condition, ‘boundaries between rival groups must be sharp enough 
so that membership is clear and, with few exceptions, unchangeable’ ( Lustick, 
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1979 : 325; see  Guelke, 2012 , for alternative definitions), and this too is rec-
ognizable in clear distinctions of the physical habitus – particularly between 
secularists and many conservative Muslims – and the relative difficulty of, and 
lack of inclination for, ‘breaking out’ of one’s social milieu or changing one’s 
dispositions. The museum also functions as a performative site of membership, 
for the self-selection of the audience and their evident physical and emotional 
engagements with the museum displays are also behaviours that construct col-
lectivity and the sense that there are like-minded people here. There is no space 
in this chapter to explore this important aspect, but we should remember that 
visitors’ behaviours and gaze are not entirely oriented towards their solitary 
encounters with the displays, but also towards one another. 
 Lustick’s ‘deeply divided society’ can also be understood in relation to 
polarization – a common but imprecise catchword in Turkey – which, in Jack 
Barbalet’s discussion, is when different social groups ‘fail to share common 
reference points cognitively and affectively, that is to say they literally live in 
different worlds’. This means that there is a fundamental breakdown in sympa-
thy, so that the ‘humanity of the other is simply not accessible’ ( Barbalet, 2006 : 
46–47). The result is a deep divide and animosity that cannot be bridged unless 
there is a significant change of circumstances, such as, perhaps, the entrance 
onto the scene of a new common foe that unites previously antagonistic par-
ties. The antagonistic play of different repertoires of historical narratives, sym-
bols, and heroes can be seen as part of this divide, as ‘reference points’ specific 
to one group that are not shared by another, meaning that people ‘live in differ-
ent worlds’, or rather, different imaginations of Turkey, and fail to sympathize 
with others to the point of resentment. 
 What P1453 helps to show is the way in which political and emotional 
attachments to a particular past can build and consolidate social division. In 
Lustick’s ‘control’ model of divided society, as opposed to a consociational 
model based on forms of collaboration and compromise, a divided society 
requires mechanisms to impose stability. Such mechanisms may include legal 
ones or the persecution of dissidents as enemies of the state, but they may also 
include official heritage management and uses of the past. We might, in this 
sense, see P1453 as a physical and symbolic site for the cultivation of animos-
ity that is in some sense a mechanism of control. This mechanism may help to 
guarantee the stability and ascendancy of one political community, that is also 
a memory and emotional community, at the expense of another – not only to 
keep the ‘sensation of the conquest alive’, but also to keep alive resentful affects 
and the corollary inclination to act against foes, if not ‘with swords and shields’, 
then with the vote. 
 The critical point is that emotionalized historical memory cultures are imbri-
cated with the ‘politics of propinquity’, and that imbrication is both foundational 
and dynamic. We can talk of strategically opportune constructions of memory 
to achieve political ends, as when the JDP ‘invents tradition’ ( Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, [1983]1992 ) or develops new historical mythologies. But it is important 
to recognize that these are often affective transformations of durable structures 
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of public memory, including latent or sometimes suppressed ones, which is why 
they have power and salience for communities; it is why ideological approaches 
are invisible to some producers or naturalized as objective, neutral history – ‘tell-
ing it as it happened’. It is also why there is a need to find ways to understand 
and show the mutuality of political, emotional, and memory cultures. P1453 
offers an immersive return to the past, an occasion for imaginative work through 
which people simultaneously regain an imagined past while also facing up to 
its loss and vilifying contemporary social and political foes. Here, the signifi-
cance of the Conquest is that it has to be ‘alive’ and yet ‘taken away from us’ 
simultaneously, in order for people to feel both loss and the blissful possibility 
of rebecoming, to feel both grievance and the promise of vengeance, and to be 
both victim and victor. 
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 Notes 
 1 Topbaş, Özleyis (2009).  Comment from museum guestbook reproduced in ‘Significant Visitors’ sec-
tion of the Panorama 1453 Museum website . Notably, subsequent to the resignation of Kadir 
Topbaş as Mayor of Istanbul, comments by him and his wife about the museum were 
removed from the website, alongside others. The new ‘Significant Visitors’ page on the 
museum website only has one comment, made by the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: 
 https://www.panoramikmuze.com/en/significant-visits ( accessed 14 May 2019). 
 2 Another, related, dimension is the use of the Ottoman Empire as inspiration for regaining 
a position of international geopolitical power, as discussed by Kaya and Tecmen in this 
volume. 
 3 ‘About’ section, Turkish Panorama 1453 Museum Website (2018), http://panoramikmuze.
com/panorama-1453/hakk%C4%B1nda.aspx# (accessed 15 May 2018), my translation. 
These texts reflect the content of the website until 2018, during which changes were 
made and texts removed. 
 4 ‘Türkiye’nin ilk panoramik müzesi “İstanbul’un Fethi’ni” yeniden yaşatacak .  .  .’ http://
www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Lists/Haber/DispForm.aspx?ID=17004 (accessed on 14 July 2019). 
 5 This was put in place in 2016. 
 6 This was a random sample (approaching every third visitor or visitor group) over weekdays 
and weekends. The resulting data was coded using NVivo. It should be noted that this is 
not a statistically representative sample of the whole population of visitors, but rather a view 
into the dispositions and responses of a limited number of people. Alongside the short inter-
views, I employed a number of other qualitative visitor studies that are not presented here. 
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